I. INTRODUCTION
Since the destruction and despair caused by the dust bowl of the 1930s, the American government has taken a keen interest in natural resource conservation policy on agricultural land. As a reflection of this, the farm bill of 1936, entitled the Soil Conservation and Domestic Allotment Act, included for the first time provisions that provided payments and support to farmers willing to employ soil conservation measures on their farms (Cain and Lovejoy 2004) . While the main purpose of this bill was to provide financial support to impoverished farmers dealing with low commodity prices, the fact remains that natural resource conservation was starting to become an important issue for the American public.
Over time, conservation titles in the farm bill have evolved into legislation that not only protects soil from erosion, but now includes incentives for improving water quality and addressing water quantity problems, land retirement programs such as the Conservation The main research question is this: Is achieving behavioral change leading to more conservation about more than monetary payments, in contradiction to what is suggested by traditional microeconomic theory? Due to conservation activities not being inherently profitable to the individual farmer, conservation payments are traditionally viewed as incentives or "bribes" that should make conservation activity more attractive to the profit maximizer. Yet, mounting empirical evidence is showing that this is not the whole story. For example, modeling of conservation behavior in the upper Mississippi River region indicates that increasing conservation payments would produce minimal change in rates of soil erosion, nitrate leaching, and nitrate runoff in the area (Wu et al. 2004) ; increased conservation payments are not likely to be cost-effective on their own for addressing pollution problems in the Mississippi River and the Gulf of Mexico. So, while it is undeniable that profits do play a role, the assumption that they play the only role in economic decision making is highly contentious. In fact, work by No-wak and Korsching (1998) indicates that policy inadequacies can be attributed to a misunderstanding of the human dimension of farmers, and not a lack of conservation expenditures. Work from Sen (1977) also concludes that individuals may ultimately make choices based on sympathy and commitment to others, even if the outcomes do not maximize self-interest. A person pursuing only selfish interests is a "rational fool" and a "social moron" (Sen 1977) , very much in line with The Theory of Moral Sentiments (Smith 1759 (Smith / 1790 .
The related research question arises in the fact that the conservation literature has been unable to evolve a settled and unified account of egoistic-financial and nonfinancial social motives that ultimately drive human behavior (Chouinard et al. 2008) . We attempt to further develop such an account herein, building on the dual interests framework represented in the metaeconomics approach (Lynne 1999 (Lynne , 2006a (Lynne , 2006b , as did Chouinard et al. This framework integrates the egoistic-hedonistic self-interest motivation with empathetic-sympathetic other (shared)-interest motivation into one theory. This framing provides new insights, especially about the role of empathy, suggesting a new direction for conservation policy. The application is the emerging water quality conflict between upstream farmers and downstream water users in the Blue River/ Tuttle Creek Lake watershed of Nebraska and Kansas.
II. REVIEW OF CONSERVATION AND BEHAVIORAL LITERATURE
Financial interests are the most widely cited account for conservation adoption. This framing presumes a desire for greater profits but may also include other financial attributes including asset growth, risk reduction, and financial liquidity (Chouinard et al. 2008) . For instance, Cary and Wilkinson (1997) hypothesized that five factors could explain the planting of trees and deep-rooted grasses on farms in southeastern Australia. The idea that the conservation practice in question must be perceived as economically profitable was argued to be of paramount importance, contending that "the best way to increase the use of conservation practices to overcome land degradation . . . will be to ensure the practices are economically profitable" (Cary and Wilkinson 1997, 20) .
Others have focused on cost responsiveness using stated preferences data. For example, Lohr and Park (1995) attempted to determine the cost responsiveness of planting filter strips under the filter strip provision of the CRP among farmers in Michigan and Illinois. Using a contingent valuation (CV) framework, this study focused on whether a respondent would participate in the program, and the percentage of eligible land that would be enrolled in response to a proposed payment. Results of the study indicated that the "payment" variable had a positive and significant effect on the probability of joining the filter strip program. Cooper and Keim (1996) also used a CV framework in order to determine farmers' cost responsiveness to five different practices that protect water quality. Incentive payment offers ranging between $35 and $65 would be required to entice 50% of their sample to participate.
These studies find a significant degree of cost responsiveness and downward sloping demand for conservation practices, suggesting that subsidies are likely to yield substantial response. However, models of stated preferences do not always provide good predictors of actual behavior, making it desirable to validate the results with studies using revealed preference data. Lichtenberg (2004) uses survey data from Maryland combined with information on standard unit costs of installing seven soil-conserving and/or runoff-reducing conservation practices as identified by a state cost-sharing program. Latent demand models for each of the seven practices were developed; all exhibit a downward slope, suggesting that cost sharing could have a strong impact.
While the conservation literature is dominated by work citing financial interests, a considerable amount of work shows that other, nonfinancial interests can play a role. For example, a study of Missouri farmers shows that personal factors attributed to the individual farmer may have a substantial impact. In fact, the two most important variables in explain-ing the number of conservation practices were "either personal characteristics or related to personal characteristics: education and perception of the degree of erosion problem" (Ervin and Ervin 1982, 286) . Their findings also suggest that governmental assistance in erosion prone areas probably needs to vary depending upon operator characteristics.
In addition to human capital studies that stress general farmer characteristics like age and education levels, several other studies have analyzed the importance of farmer values and attitudes. Wallace and Clearfield (1997) examined the reasons why producers adopt stewardship practices and determined that many voluntarily install conservation practices because it is the "right thing to do." Farmers see private ownership not as a right to do what they please, but as a right to be stewards. Also, even when facing difficulties, many agricultural producers have maintained an attitude and ethic that treats farming and ranching as "a way of life," and not only a venture to maximize profits (Wallace and Clearfield 1997, 4) . Notice how these kinds of forces reflect one considering how others may be viewing some matter, and how joining into a kind of shared interest with common cause is a force affecting choice.
Similarly, in a study of the Central Platte River Valley of Nebraska, Supalla (2003) argues that producers have developed a stewardship ethic (i.e., entered into a shared empathy-sympathy with the cause) and are willing to forego profits in order to use best management practices that enhance water quality. In fact, it was discovered that 85% of producers were willing to voluntarily accept lower net returns in exchange for reduced groundwater pollution (Supalla et al. 1995 , cited in Supalla 2003 . Thus, policy instruments that facilitate expression of this shared ethic may be more likely to increase conservation technology adoption rates than policies that stress only financial incentives.
Maybery, Crase, and Gullifer (2005) also show the importance of values and attitudes. Survey responses from farmers in New South Wales, Australia, showed that producers had three distinct values: economic, conservation, and lifestyle. Also a clear separation existed between economic and conservation values, as well as between economic and lifestyle values. This suggests that "ideologically different policy approaches may have separate pathways of influence within landholder decision making" (p. 68). It can be reasonably inferred that those with strong conservation goals and weak economic goals are unlikely to respond to financial incentives as the only interest. Conversely, those with weak conservation goals are not likely to buy into volunteer conservation practices that sacrifice profits.
As evidenced from these studies, it is clear that farmers can be motivated by both financial and personal/attitudinal considerations that are not directly related to profit or financial capacity. However, as shown by Chouinard et al. (2008) , the literature has largely stepped around using a systematic integration of these two types of interests to describe conservation behavior, either by assuming that only profits and/or costs matter, or by adding social and stewardship interests in an ad hoc way. However, a recent subset of the conservation literature has started to use an integrated approach.
The general dual interests framework was first indirectly alluded to in studies of conservation decision making by Lynne, Shonkwiler, and Rola (1988) and . Attitudinal data, as well as context variable data including income and farm terrain, were collected from a personal interview survey of farmers in the panhandle of Florida. Results showed that attitudes toward conservation, perception of environmental problems, farm ownership, current profitability, income per effort, and risk were all important in predicting the effort of conservation adoption. This early work evolved with an explicit dual interest flavor by the mid-1990s (see esp. Lynne 1995), with further development throughout the late 1990s, with Lynne and Casey (1998) and Casey and Lynne (1999) testing the model for understanding the adoption of drip irrigation technology by Florida tomato farmers. This framing led to the notion that we perhaps needed to "go beyond" and "transcend" the microeconomics framing as represented in the notion of "meta," leading to the idea of a "metaeconomics" approach to economic choice more generally, as argued by Lynne (1999) . Taking cues from these empir-ical findings as well as from Sen (1977) , Hirschman (1985) , and Etzioni (1986) , among others, it was proposed that individuals pursue not only a self-interest utility, but also a shared other-interest utility rooted in social norms and the ideas of sympathy, metaranking, and commitment (Sen 1977) . Lynne (1999) labled these as "I" and "We" utilities, respectively. This leads to a testable hypothesis suggesting that the addition of the "We" utility to conventional economic models could substantively improve the explanatory power of studies intended to describe conservation behavior. More recently, Chouinard et al. (2008) , Sautter et al. (2011) , and Bishop, Shumway, and Wandschneider (2010) futher tested the framework. By the time of Sautter et al.'s study, the model had also evolved, moving away from the notion of empathy-altruism to an emphasis on empathy-sympathy as the basis for the other (shared)-interest construct. We now focus special attention in this paper on empathy (and sympathy) as perhaps the missing key in understanding conseration choice.
The theory has also been applied and tested in areas outside of the farmer conservation literature. Kalinowski, Lynne, and Johnson (2006) used the approach and theory to explain recycling behavior. Ovchinnikova et al. (2009) and Czap and Czap (2010) tested it once again, this time in an experimental economics laboratory setting, examining the potental for farmers (student participants in the laboratory) to sell carbon offsets at a reduced price to an environmental organization and, in donating money to an environmetnal organization, thus sacrificing a bit in terms of profits. Predictive capacity of the behavioral models significantly improved with the inclusion of variables that served as proxies for the empathy-sympathy-based, shared other-interest utility. Chouinard et al. (2008) builds upon this body of research to show that farmers in the Pacific Northwest are willing to trade profits for stewardship activities. They propose that farmers pursue two different kinds of utility, which they label as ego-utility and stewardship-utility, and must reconcile these competing utilities when making conservation choices. This study, too, provides empirical evidence that supports the existence of two interests in farmers. As noted, Bishop, Shumway, and Wandschneider (2010) also applied and tested the framework, using the dual motive model to suggest that the pursuit of joint, dual (private and social) utility impacted the decision to use anaerobic digesters on dairy farms in the Pacific Northwest. The empirical analysis confirms it, concluding that models integrating dual motives into one coherent theory may well be the best way to explain conservation behavior.
In actuality, the trace for this dual interest, dual utility kind of framing goes back much further than that represented in the conservation literature, recent or otherwise. This longer-term history is traced by Lynne (1995; 2006a) , pointing especially to "das Adam Smith Problem," as characterized in a grand debate among German scientists many years ago (also see Smith 1998 for a more contemporary look at the "two faces"). Adam Smith (1759/1790) characterized economic choice as reflecting both self-interest and other (shared)-interest, the latter reflected in the moral sentiments. His famous quote, "Not from the benevolence . . . that we expect our dinner, but from their care for their own interest" (Smith 1776 , Book I, Chapter 2) respresents the primary drive. We then find in his other book (Smith 1759/1787, Part I, Section I, Chapter 1), "How selfish soever, man may be supposed, there are evidently some principles in his nature, which interest him in the fortune of others." He then goes on to explain how the latter works to temper and condition the pursuit of the self-interest, through the methaphorical method of the "impartial spectator," putting oneself in the shoes of others, and asking "How would I wish to be treated?," which would then lead to a tempering of the self-interest. Similar themes can be found in several key, seminal papers written in more recent years, including those by Sen (1977) and Etzioni (1986 Etzioni ( , 1988 , with literally hundreds of derivative works from these two writings alone. The bottome line is that dual interests theory serves the role of an integrating framework, bringing the many variants on ideas-like subselfs, commitment, moral sentiments, moral dimension, sympathy-under one umbrella. In that sense, it brings little that is new to the table, except the unique integration itself. As Lester (1995, 161) notes, in referring to a similar problem in psychology: "Researchers await a new theorist who will assimilate the old theories and present an integrated theory incorporationg previous concepts and propositions. A cynical colleague of mine once said that such a task requires the services of someone in marketing because the ideas will not be new ones but merely old ones presented in new packaging." Perhaps this paper is about marketing as much as it is about elaborating an alternative framework. The dual interests notion is also consistent with findings in research by neuroscientists and evolutionary biologists. There may acutally be a biological basis for dual interests in humans, a case made by Cory (2006a Cory ( , 2006b in building upon triune brain theory as developed by evolutionary neuroscientist MacLean (1990) . In this approach, it is suggested that the human brain has evolved into a three-level joint and nonseparable, modular structure. The three levels are named the reptilian complex, giving rise to the egoistic-based self-interest; the paleomammalian (or "old mammalian") complex, giving rise to the empathy-based other (shared)-interest; and the neocortex, which facilitates rational choice in integrating and balancing the egoisitic and empathetic forces. Bishop, Shumway, and Wandschneider (2010) provide a more detailed discusion of this literature, which is also detailed by Lynne (2006a) .
Based upon this substantive body of previous work, including original propositions going back at least to Adam Smith, the main hypothesis to be tested is this: Empathy-sympathy works to temper and condition the role of the financial (egoistic-hedonistic sourced) factors at work in influencing the decision to be a conservation farmer. If confirmed, this would provide a substantively different scientific basis for designing conservation policy and programs.
III. THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK
We test the proposition that the best way to represent farmer conservation tendencies is to posit joint interest functions, or, if you prefer, joint utility functions, represented in Figure 1 , shown mathematically as
M M where ‫ס‬attributes of industrial inputs and d control, nonallocable (which produces the jointness, see Lynne 1988) between the interests; ‫ס‬attributes of conservation practices e using conservation tillage as a proxy, also nonallocable between the interests; I G ‫ס‬the interests represented in profit and/or utility associated with the composite production of corn-soybeans-sorghum, the three main commodities in the Blue River watershed; and I M ‫ס‬the shared interests or utility associated with improved water quality in Tuttle Creek Lake and the environmental effects in the watershed in general. Notice, too, this structure focuses only on the interests and utility within the individual farmer. This is to say, this is not an other-regarding kind of structure; these 1. Rather than one, there are now two sets of isocurves, one representing the egoistichedonistic self-interest (I G ) and one the empathetic-sympathetic other (shared, internalized)-interest (I M ).
2. Absolute jointness is represented by the overlap of the two sets; there is an intersection of both interests at every point in the space, as represented at points A, B, and C. In the context of the current study, traditional profitbearing outputs (corn-soybeans-sorghum) are represented in the I G isocurves, whereas more community/shared outputs (associated with empathy toward improved water quality in Tuttle Creek Lake) are represented in the I M isocurves. This set of overlapping isocurves also gives the underlying reason and otherwise justifies the shape of the production possibility frontiers (PPF) used by Chouinard et al. (2008) and Bishop, Shumway, and Wandschneider (2010) . A PPF curve like this comes from moving along R o R o in Figure 1 , due to the inherent jointness in marketable and environmental outputs. As we start at the top and move down this capital line, notice how both I G (referred to generally as "profit" in Figure  2 ) and I M (referred to generally as "environmental effects" in Figure 2 ) are increasing until we reach the maximum marketable output at point A. This is depicted by the positive slope toward the top of the PPF in Figure 2 . As we continue down the R o R o capital budget line, the "profit" declines, while the positive environmental effects increase. Once we go beyond point C (not illustrated in these other papers), both decline, giving positive slope to the bottom of the PPF curve. These positive slope regions of the PPF in Figure 2 are complementary areas: more of both outcomes result from moving toward the competitive zone AC. There is also the potential for synergistic, symbiotic complementarity (see Lynne 2006a Lynne , 113, 2006b Figure 1) ; right-to-left movements in their figures can also be handled with the overlapping isocurves, albeit now the environmental effects are negative, rather than positive. The idea of jointness in the interests gives a sound analytical foundation to the notion of a PPF.
3. A farmer is unable to pursue self-interest without simultaneously pursuing shared other-interest. Yet, the tendency within the conservation literature is to treat these choice behaviors as separable, independent effects involving simple trade-offs. This framing fails to see that paths 0G and 0M are interrelated, and, that in fact, most framers will likely move along a path 0Z, which is not about maximization, but rather about finding a satisfactory integration and balance in the interests, "peace-of-mind" as it were. Also, these "trade-offs" are anything but simple, seeing instead a complex mix of subconscious emotions and habits; occasionally and recurring, consciously cognitive calculation; and an ultimate integration and balancing reflected on some emergent path 0Z. The notion that the subconscious emotions temper and condition conscious thought and choice, with said thought also influencing the substance of the subconscious, has been documented in neuroscience research (see, especially, Damasio 2000, with "Descartes' Error" being that reason and rational choice were somehow separable from the underlying, largely subconscious emotion). This also lends scientific substance to Kahneman's (2003) claim that economic choice often reflects subtle, subconscious "intuition."
4. The proposed framework allows for testing traditional presumptions about self-interest; a farmer that moves along path 0G-actually, Homo economicus would move up the vertical axis-and will not be very likely to apply conservation farming.
5. We can also test for the tendency to take the other path, 0M; a person that pursues this path might be characterized as Homo sociologicus, akin to the nature of human behavior presumed in sociology. A farmer portrayed in this fashion is assumed to be motivated primarily by empathetic-sympathetic tendencies leading to interdependent roles and solidarity in a densely networked farming community, while identifying with place and others and buying into conservation norms and traditions in the community. By settling upon point C in the space, a farmer uses many conservation techniques and will use relatively small amounts of industrial inputs. Such farmers are buying into a conservation ethic, being about "feeling with" and being "in sympathy with" (Solomon 2007, 64) other conservation farmers and downstream water users. This also recognizes the need for first identifying with and walking in the same space as others (i.e., empathizing) as a precondition to the evolution of this shared conservation ethic (i.e., joining in shared sympathy with).
6. This formulation proffers that both dispositions must be considered jointly; instead of choosing to maximize a single interest, it is posited that the farmer strives to integrate both interests on path 0Z. This is represented by point B in the space; we might describe this conservation farmer as Homo empathicus, tempering the tendency to maximize entropy (and profit, wealth, which comes from so doing) with empathy/sympathy-based interests, a description suggested by Rifkin (2009, 42) for those who truly contribute to achieving sustainability. Empathy becomes the key in adopting conservation practices and achieving long-term environmental and economic sustainability.
7. Both sets I G and I M and the paths 0G and 0M tend to be in the subconscious of the individual and thus not often considered, with path 0M perhaps even deeper in the subconscious. We represent 0G as one dot and a dash, and 0M is represented with two dots and a dash, indicating it is less frequently made explicit. While paths 0G and 0M frame the space within which cognitively conscious, rational economic choice (and overall self-control) is expressed, the two paths themselves have influence through intuition, the kind of intuition described by Kahneman (2003) . It is also quite likely that even 0Z, once cognitively considered, may become part of an individual's intuition, going into the subconscious, and farmers once again act more on habit. This is a major theme woven throughout McCown's (2005, 22) work; he is building upon the idea of phenomenology in decision making submitted by Schutz and Luckmann (1973) , in noting that "in normal routine activity, commitments are made, and action is taken without conscious deliberation" (italics added).
8. It perhaps cannot be emphasized enough that path 0M is likely more subtle, more in the background than path 0G. Another way to state this is that empathy-sympathy gets subtle expression in the underlying institutions (as defined by Bromley [2006] to include norms and traditions, working rules of organizations, and property rules) in the foundation of economic choice and efficiency. We might even say this tendency to empathy and the shared other-interest is latent and needs to be irritated (as Bromley [2006] argues generally about policy change) into attention, such that it might explicitly temper and condition the pursuit of self-interest.
9. This formulation also describes how control and self-control play an important role in decision making. For example, a farmer moving along path 0G will likely use intensive tillage practices in order to help facilitate deeper root penetration, more control over planting dates, and destruction of weeds. In contrast, a person moving along path 0M is more willing to give up some control to the natural ecological system. A farmer on this path is also more likely to give in to more control coming out of regulations or other kinds of external controls (i.e., landlords). It follows that making the role and need for selfcontrol explicit is also an important feature. The preference for less control and the ability to take control also works to temper the selfinterest, in forming the integrated owninterest.
10. Most importantly, this formulation posits the individual farmer engaging in selfsacrifice in both domains of interest, giving a new, expanded meaning to the notion of altruism. By locating at point B, farmers are choosing to sacrifice a bit in both domains:
and . This is to say, the 2 3 2 3
producers generally need to give up some profit in order to install conservation measures and do the right thing for the environment, yet they also sacrifice some of the positive environmental effects from less-polluted water downstream in order to earn enough profit to remain viable: altruism works in both directions. Recent empirical evidence has shown that conservation farmers operate with such sacrifices. In their study of farmers in the Pacific Northwest, Chouinard et al. (2008) found that producers, on average, are willing to sacrifice $4.52 per acre in order to invest in conservation. However, these farmers are also sacrificing in the social-utility (shared otherinterest) domain in order to make their farming operations profitable. We achieve a kind of peace of mind on path 0Z. 11. Finally, the decision choice comes together in Figure 2 , which represents an even higher level of control, this time reflecting self-control in the orientation one takes. We see another set of indifference structures of the same character as illustrated by Chouinard et al. (2008, Figure 2) , being tangent to the interests frontier, the latter derived from moving along capital constraint R o R o . Chouinard et al. (2008, 73) associate these kinds of indifference relations with the production possibilities frontier between profit and positive environmental effects. We are essentially doing the same thing, although on a higher plane, in that profit is primarily the result of pursuing the self-interest, while positive environmental effects arise from pursuing the other-interest. Thus, those farmers that maximize profits and the utility it can buy would be found at point A. Those who focus on maximizing positive environmental effects shared in the community of interest are found at C. The more intriguing point B, arising from the expression of I 2 , reflects the outcome of a farmer applying a kind of "metapreference" (see George [2004] on this matter of higher order preferences that work to "trump" lowerlevel preferences) that includes both cognitive and emotional as well as financial capability and control considerations (as reflected in Figure 1) . I 2 illustrates a farmer who has moved beyond both mere self-interest and mere other (shared)-interest, reaching a higher plane through expressions of empathy-sympathy. Also, I 2 works to resolve incommensurability in the interests, not requiring that all outcomes be measured in the same (utilitarian, monetary) units. Several years of testing of this framework suggests most, if not all, conservation farmers are at points like B.
IV. EMPIRICAL MODEL: THE DEMAND FOR CONSERVATION PRACTICES
The demand for conservation practices, most likely being along 0Z, is now represented by e ‫ס‬ e(r ,r ,R,N,I ,I ,H,V).
[3]
Standard economic variables are represented in the input prices r and capital/income constraint R; for this study, r d and r e are essentially the same for every farmer, due to all farmers having the same input sources, so only R is further considered herein. In addition, the physical context (soil and land characteristics, climate) is N. As Chouinard et al. (2008, 68) argue, with everyone seeking profit, only such variables would explain variation in farmer choices, a hypothesis tested further herein. We also test additional hypothesis, however, due to self-interest I G and the other (shared)-interest I M not "dropping out" of the demand derivation (see Lynne 2006a Lynne , 2006b , for the mathematical argument), which means these interests represented in the utility (or at least a proxy for utility) need to be measured in order to quantify demand. As Kahneman, Wakker, and Sarin (1997) have argued it, we need to return to Bentham, that is, go back to cardinal utility, as demonstrated in the following empirical analysis wherein we use proxies for utility. Also, due to the jointness (overlapping indifference curves) and the role of I M in conditioning choice, and control V reinforcing I G , we would wish to account for such interactions in the empirical model. As dual interest theory and the metaeconomics framework teach, there are few, if any, independent and separable effects. The ultimate goal of this research is to use the information and insights gained in order to encourage and perhaps "nudge" (in the spirit of Thaler and Sunstein [2008] , who frame the notion of nudging in a kind of "libetarian paternalism") behavioral change in the use of conservation measures. Models that are probabilistic in nature are best suited to this task, with the nudging focused on increasing the odds of adopting conservation technologies, with particular focus on tillage strategies. Therefore, a logit version of equation [3] is used, with four logit models of the following functional forms considered:
where X 1 ‫1ס‬ if any amount of conservation tillage is used on the farm, and 0 represents a farmer that used only reduced and/or conventional tillage; R i ‫ס‬the income (as a proxy for financial capacity) of the ith farmer; N i ‫ס‬the physical characteristics of the ith farmer's crop land; I Gi ‫ס‬ proxy for self-interest of the ith farmer; I Mi ‫ס‬proxy for the shared otherinterest of the ith farmer; H i ‫ס‬proxy for ha- 
Description of Study Area
The Blue River/Tuttle Creek Lake watershed covers a large portion of southcentral and southeast Nebraska, as well as northeast Kansas. However, the use of natural resource assessment maps and empirical surface water quality data allowed physical scientists involved in this project to identify a critical four-county area of non-point-source runoff near the Nebraska-Kansas border. This area includes Jefferson and Gage counties in Nebraska, and Washington and Marshall counties in Kansas.
While the physical characteristics of the land in the watershed contribute to water quality issues in the region, the current institutional situation in the watershed also contributes to the problem. The historical presumption in the watershed has been that farmers upstream of Tuttle Creek Lake have the privilege to allow chemicals and sediments to run off and deposit into rivers and streams. Traditionally, upstream farmers have not been obligated to be concerned with downstream water users' lack of rights to clean water. Both state laws and the Federal Clean Water Act are slowly but surely changing this to a rightsduties correlate (see Bromley 1991 Bromley , 2006 , for the framework describing privilegeno rights and the transition to rights-duties), putting a greater burden of cleaning contaminated water on those that are currently contributing to subpar water quality, especially when downstream water users can definitively show which entities are creating the water pollution. In reality, though, agricultural runoff is a non-point-source of pollution, and, at this time, those downstream of Tuttle Creek Lake can do little about it. Therefore, the lack of a common vision-lack of a shared "being in sympathy with" vision-between farmers and lake users for solving the problem keeps the lake polluted.
In recent years, the institutions in the Tuttle Creek waterhed have been called into question by downstream water users. Thus, irritation has started to build within and between the upstream agricultural producers and downstream water users, relating to the desire for clean water for recreational purposes, general concern for plants and animals that use the water, and aesthetics. Also, outflow from Tuttle Creek Lake provides approximately 50% of water flow to the Kansas River. The Kansas River, in turn, provides drinking water to major population centers in northeast Kansas, including Kansas City.
Water quantity is an ever-widening concern. It was reported in the Topeka CapitalJournal (Stafford 2003 ) that the population of Johnson County, Kansas, had grown by 27% between 1990 and 2000, and that the city of Olathe alone had grown by 47%. Given the almost complete reliance in this area of Kansas on surface water, Tuttle Creek Lake will become an ever more important source for water supply. However, the capacity for the reservoir to hold water (as is true of many midwestern U.S. lakes) has been reduced due to siltation. Therefore, practices upstream that contribute to soil erosion and siltation (as well as fertilizers and other chemicals in the water) are now looked upon in a negative light. So, given the interaction between the physical land characteristics and the institutional arrangements, a study that focuses on behavioral change that improves water quality in the region was deemed essential, as delineated in the USDA request for proposals that led to the grant funding for this study.
Data Collection
Data was collected via a mail survey instrument, following the basic Dillman (2000) survey method. A total of 4,191 surveys were mailed to farm operators in the four-county target area of the watershed. Names and addresses were obtained from farm operator lists maintained by the local county offices of the Farm Service Agency (FSA), USDA. In the original survey mailing, operators were offered $40 to complete the survey. A subsequent mailing of the survey commenced a few weeks after the first mailing was complete. This mailing included a random subsample of 460 nonrespondents of the original 3,731 operators. This time, respondents were offered $80, giving only a modest change in the response rate. Overall, the response rate from the 3,731 operators was 17.1% (639 survey responses). Due to missing responses on the proposed dependent variables, 498 surveys were used for statistical analysis.
While a survey response rate of 17.1% is not out of line with other similar research (see Chouinard et al. 2008) , some may choose to argue that the response is too low to make generalizations about the farming population in the study area. However, there is evidence to suggest that the survey response rate is likely substantively larger than 17.1%. First, the survey created was intended to be administered to farm operators in the target area, as the operators are the individuals most likely to be in the field making conservation decisions. However, the primary investigators listed on the cover page of the administered survey received several phone calls and email correspondence from individuals who had received the survey and do not participate in day-to-day farming operations. This antecdotal evidence suggests that both operators as well as several owners/landlords received the survey. It seems the FSA farm operator lists were not properly maintained and oversampling did occur.
There is other evidence that oversampling occurred. FSA operator lists indicated that there were 3,731 operators. Yet, according to the National Agricultural Statistics Service census for 2002, there were only 3,184 farms. Therefore, if it is assumed that each farm has one principal operator, oversampling by at least 550 individuals occurred in the sample. If we remove these 550 surveys from the overall sample, the survey response rate is 20%, well within the bounds of a reasonable response rate, especially for a questionnaire of this length and complexity.
Description of Variables Used
The dependent variable in this study is a binary (0,1) variable created from answers reported in Questions 2a and 2b of the administered survey instrument. 1 Question 2a asked: "Please indicate the approximate number of acres you farmed by each crop type under each tillage practice in 2007 on your HEL (Highly Erodible Land) fields." Question 2b was the same but asked about the "Not Erodible" fields. These questions used a matrix format (crops ϫ tillage practices) in order to ascertain the number of acres under each type of tillage regime. Respondents reported the number of acres under conventional tillage (less than 15% crop residue), reduced tillage (15% to 30% crop residue), and conservation tillage/no-till (greater than 30% crop residue) cropping schemes. As noted earlier, those respondents that use any amount of conservation tillage/no-till received a score of 1 (mean of 0.82, with a range of 0.72 to 0.88 across the counties in the sample), and those that used reduced and conventional tillage received a score of 0.
Income/Financial Capacity
Income data was collected to represent the financial component (R i ) via Question 33. Respondents were asked to choose a category that best described their total income from both gross farm sales and conservation payments. Responses were scaled such that the final income variable is reported in thousands of dollars representing the midvalue in each category. Also, missing income values were treated with mean substitution.
Soil Slope
The physical context of the land in production is always an important determinant in the adoption of conservation technologies. In the case of tillage strategies, the most important physical factor is likely soil slope (i.e., land steepness). In order to compute soil slope (N i ), individual survey respondents were asked to mark an "X" on a county map (Question 36), indicating the general location of their principal farm. Then, latitude and longitude coordinates of the farms were determined by using the computer program 3-D Topoquads. The geograpic coordinates were utilized in geographic information systems (GIS) software in order to obtain a general indicator of soil slope on that farm.
Self-interest ϫ Other-interest
The Self-interest ϫ Other-interest variable (I Gi ϫ I Mi ) is the core variable of the dual interests model. As theorized, humans rely upon joint, nonseparable self-interest tempered by empathy-sympathy reflected in the shared other-interest tendency. For this reason, selfinterest and other-interest variables cannot be modeled separately. Thus, proxies for an individual's self-interest and other-interest tendencies were multiplied. Three proxies were used to measure a respondent's orientation toward a shared other-interest; the need for three different shared other-interest proxies is due to the fact that other-interest dispositions in humans are thought to evolve from empathy through sympathy to influence:
1. Empathy was measured with portions of the Davis (1980) Empathy Scale, Question 22, using statements like "I find it difficult to project myself into a downstream water user's situation." 2. Sympathy was measured with a scale created by the authors, Question 23, in statements like "I can easily be in sympathy with public water suppliers below the dam in places like Lawrence, KS, and Kansas City." 3. Influence by others was measured with an expectancy-valence scale, probability (belief) X value, guided by the theory of planned behavior (Ajzen 1991) , in Questions 19 and 20, for example, "How likely do you think it is that that these people believe you should use conservation tillage?" and "How much do you value the views of these people?," which are multiplied to give the expectancy-valance, a measured level of utility. The groups included chemical and seed suppliers, recreational and water supply users, and family members.
Empathy is the precursor and could, indeed, be the most fundamental feature of conservation choice, a part of our very being. Psychologists and neuroscientists such as Decety, Michalska, and Akitsuki (2008) have shown with functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) that the programming for empathy, drawing on their results in studying normal functioning children, has been "hardwired" into the brain circuitry. Their results are consistent with previous fMRI studies involving adults. Thus, the ability to empathize with other humans is an innate characteristic possessed by most, although to varying degrees. Empathy is also found in nature, within many other species (see de Waal 2009). Therefore, it is also proposed in this paper that the farmers have the ability, in varying degrees, to project themselves into the perceived mental state of others (i.e., "walk in the shoes of others"), especially downstream water users.
While empathy is defined as the ability to project oneself into the mental state of others, sympathy is defined in a much different manner herein. While most perhaps relate sympathy to feelings of compassion, this paper instead defines sympathy in much the same way as it is defined by the philosopher Solomon (2007): A human's ability to sympathize is characterized as the ability to buy into a specific group ethic. Individuals first can project themselves into the state of mind of specific groups (i.e., empathize) and then choose to become "in sympathy with" the group if the group ethic and goals align with the individual's (evolving) goals. However, it needs to be emphasized that the act of empathizing does not automatically lend itself to sympathy. Becoming in sympathy with a group is still an individual choice that can be accepted or rejected, but empathizing does provide important information to the individual that aids in the decision making process. So, it is proposed that all farmers have the ability to empathize (albeit we expect substantive heterogeneity), but it is unlikely that all farmers have become in sympathy with others that use water downstream, with the extent to which empathy and sympathy are operant having substantive implications for policy and programs applied in the area.
Acts of empathizing and sympathizing, done as an act of mind within the self and in interaction with others, may eventually lead to being influenced to take action. Therefore, the influence of others variable was created in order to assess which groups are influencing conservation behavior. Influence from three groups was tested: family members, farm entities (i.e., seed suppliers, machinery dealers, etc.), and downstream water users.
Only one proxy was needed to assess a farmer's orientation toward the self-interest tendency created from the selfism scale (Phares and Erskine 1984) . This scale has been widely tested in psychology-based research and deemed reliable in assessing narcissistic (selfish) tendencies. This scale was administered through Question 24, using statements like "Getting ahead in life depends mainly on thinking of yourself first." Using these kinds of scales (including the empathy scale, as described above), represents a substantive departure from most other farmer conservation studies, taking the behavioral research in this study closer to basic science. These kinds of scales are used herein because we seek to discover the fundamental drivers in conservation choices and human behavior more generally.
To create the self-other variables, the survey results from the selfism scale were reversed, that is, the 1-7 scale with 7 representing the highest score (i.e., most oriented to the self-interest) was reversed to a 7-1 scale before multiplying by the various other-interest scales, such that a high overall score (e.g., 49) means being both high on the other-interest scale (a 7) and low on the egoistic (selfism) scale (a 7). The result was three variables that could be used in three separate tests: the test of empathy, the test of sympathy, and the test of influence, the latter reflecting the outcome of the empathy-sympathy process.
Habit
Metaeconomics suggests that farm operators run largely on emotion or subconscious feelings about farming strategies that have worked in the past, pragmatically speaking. As Kahneman (2003 Kahneman ( , 1450 argues, "effort- less thought is the norm" in the everyday lives of humans. So, it seems justifiable to add a measure of habit (R i ) to the empirical metaeconomic model. Habitual tendencies in relation to conservation tillage strategies were measured by asking the following question: "Is the percentage of your farm under conservation tillage/no-till less, the same, or more than 3 years ago?" Responses were recorded on a sevenpoint Likert scale.
Self-interest ϫ Control
As noted earlier, dual interests theory proposes that a farmer's preferences for and perceptions of control over his or her farming operations can have a large impact upon conservation technologies used. For this reason, farmers were asked to respond to several items that assess a person's views in regard to control over specific farm processes. A variant on the McAuley, Duncan, and Russell (1992) causal dimension scale was used to measure preferences of control.
Question 15 assesses three types of control: control over daily farming operations (e.g., "I have/do not have control over weeds, etc."), control that others can exert over farming decisions (e.g., "Landlords regulate/do not regulate use of these practices"), and control over nature (e.g., "I have/do not have control over nature"). Respondents simply marked an "X" on these continuums.
This measurement (I Gi ϫ I Vi ) is very similar in nature to the idea of autonomous versus heteronomous control presented by Angyal (1967) , in which autonomous control is represented as internal self-control and heteronomous control is represented as control exerted upon the individual by others or the environment. It is hypothesized that those who feel that they can use conservation tillage strategies and still maintain a great amount of autonomous control over farming processes will be more likely to use conservation tillage on individual farms. In contrast, those that believe using conservation tillage technologies reduce their autonomous control over farming processes too much will be less likely to use conservation tillage strategies.
V. RESULTS
Summary descriptive statistics for all variables used in the logit models of conservation tillage adoption are provided in Table 1 . Inspection of the table provides some intriguing insights into the psychological makeup of the respondents. First, notice that the selfism scale indicates that self-interest tendencies are in fact present within farmers in the watershed. However, the mean score of 3.29 is much less than might be predicted using the standard framing of adoption using traditional microeconomics. In fact, a microeconomics frame would suggest that the mean score of the selfism scale would be much closer to 7.00, and, being exactly true to the theory, everyone would need to be exactly 7.00. Instead, the final selfism score shows that respondents are actually closer to selfless, rather than selfish.
In addition to selfish tendencies being present within respondents, survey results also indicate that shared other-interest tendencies in the form of empathy and sympathy also exist within the region. Intriguingly, a comparison of the means show that shared other-interest tendencies occur at a greater magnitude than self-interest tendencies. This finding especially places microeconomic-based renditions of farmer behavior in question.
Closer inspection of Table 1 also provides some critical information regarding dual interests theory. Previously, it was noted that the theory posits that all individuals are perhaps born with an innate ability to empathize, in varying degrees. The ability to empathize, then, can ultimately lead an individual to become "in sympathy with" the shared ethics of a particular group. It was carefully noted, though, that the ability to empathize does not necessarily lead to sympathy.
Information given in Table 1 shows that this idea may in fact be plausible. The mean score of the final empathy scale is 5.06 units. Given that empathy was measured with a seven-point Likert scale, respondents clearly have the ability to empathize with other individuals. Comparing the empathy scale with the scale that measures sympathy, though, indicates that there is a great amount of variability in the respondents' ability to sympathize with groups that use Tuttle Creek Lake. First, the mean score of the sympathy scale was 4.73 units, a result that is lower (statistically significant at p‫10.0ס‬ level) than the mean score of the final empathy scale. Second, and more importantly, the standard deviation of the sympathy scale was 1.088 units. This result is higher than the standard deviation of the empathy scale, at 0.807 units. We can reasonably speculate that all respondents in the four-county target area have the ability to empathize (albeit at different capacities), whereas not all respondents have become in sympathy with the downstream users. This result has substantive implications for policy and nudge programming. Tables 2, 3 , and 4 provide the logit test results used to understand tillage decisions. In all three models, the column "Role of Capital" is representative of equation [4] and the standard microeconomic demand function; the column "Adding Tempered Self" is representative of equation [5] and represents the most basic metaeconomic demand function that introduces the role of empathy/ sympathy in tempering self-interest; the column "Adding Habitual Tendency" is representative of equation [6] and adds the habit variable; and finally, the column "Adding Selfism-Reinforced Control" is representative of equation [7] and adds the three control variables.
Intriguing insights include the traditional finding that financial capacity/income is a significant variable (see "Role of Capital"). The chi-square statistic also shows the financial models to be significant in explaining tillage behavior. While significant, though, it should be noted that the coefficient on the income variable indicates that an increase in income actually has a very small impact on a farmer's tillage decision. In fact, a $1,000 increase in gross income (including conservation payments) increases the odds of conservation tillage adoption by only 0.06%. Also note that the microeconomic model does a poor job of predicting which respondents do not use conservation tillage technologies.
The basic dual interests demand model is presented in Tables 2, 3 , and 4 under the column "Adding Tempered Self." Notice that in all three tables, the income variable remains significant, just as in the microeconomics model. Yet, we also find that the primary dual interest variable, Self-interest ϫ Shared otherinterest, is also statistically significant and contributes substantively to understanding of tillage behavior. This power of the motive interaction was also documented by Bishop, Shumway, and Wandschneider (2010) ; the positive sign on the Private ϫ Social motives variable is consistent with the findings here: empathy (other-interest) tempers and conditions ego (self-interest) in bringing about conservation choice. The chi-square (block) statistic also shows that adding the tempered self-interest variable improves the overall model fit. Also, we find that the R-square statistic increased from 0.10 to 0.159. Table 3 , which presents the results using sympathy as a proxy, tells much the same story. Again, income is a significant variable. However, like the model that uses empathy, the Selfism ϫ Sympathy variable is also significant; sympathy tempers self-interest. We again see that the chi-square (block) statistic indicates that the addition of this variable improves overall model fit, and the Nagelkerke R-square statistic increases from 0.10 to 0.12.
Finally, Table 4 shows that the influence variables, the outcome of an empathy-sympathy process, are also strong predictors of conservation. Again, income is a significant variable, and the Selfism ϫ Farm entity coefficient is also significant. Intriguingly, the fact that both other lake users and family members do not appear to impact the conservation tillage decision in farmers residing above Tuttle Creek Lake indicates that the empathy-sympathy process has not yet resulted in influence by these others; this suggests a place for nudging to be focused. This dual interest framing continues to yield a better fitting model than the standard demand model, evidenced by the significant chi-square (block) statistic and an increase in the Nagelkerke R-square statistic from 0.10 to 0.185.
Inspection of the tables also reveals that adding habitual tendencies, as metaeconomics predicts, does in fact improve the demand model, regardless of which empathy-sympathy-based other-interest proxy is used. In all three cases, the habit variable is also significant and in the hypothesized positive direction. In addition, the income and shared other-interest variables all remain significant in all three models. The addition of a habit variable also substantially improves the model fit. All three chi-square (block) statistics are significant, and in all three instances we find considerable increases in the Nagelkerke Rsquare statistics. This suggests that subconscious feelings about tillage decisions made in the past play a great part in tillage decisions that are made today, and likely extend into the future; this also suggests fertile ground for nudging behaviors onto new conservation paths, and that care be taken in not shifting conservation farmers away from their habitual path. We also find that the control variables presented in the columns "Adding Selfism-Reinforced Control" also help to refine and improve the model. Regardless of the empathy-sympathy proxy used, the Selfism ϫ Farm control variable becomes a significant predictor. The variable is also in the hypothesized negative direction; farmers wanting more control do not favor conservation tillage. Again, the addition of the control variables contributes significantly to the overall model fit, as evidenced by the significant chi-square (block) statistic in all three cases. The Nagelkerke R-square statistics also increase with the addition of the control variables. It should be noted, though, that only the Selfism ϫ Farm control variable is significant, indicating that an individual's preferences for power over nature and attitudes toward control exerted on their farms by others are not as important.
Also, regarding how to evaluate the statistical and empirical power of this approach, we need remember there are various indices for reporting goodness of fit measures in logistic regression. These measures include the R 2 L statistic, the Cox and Snell R 2 index, and the Nagelkerke index. None of these measures are without limitations, and there is no single agreed upon index of goodness of fit for logistic regression (Cohen et al. 2003) . We have chosen to report the Nagelkerke R 2 index. There are substantial differences between the R 2 L , Cox and Snell, and Nagelkerke R 2 indexes. This is because the Nagelkerke index corrects for the fact that the Cox and Snell index does not reach the theoretical maximum of 1.0. Therefore, the Nagelkerke index will always be larger than the other two indices. However, the Nagelkerke index adjustment to 1.0 is considered an appropriate adjustment relative to the Cox and Snell index (Cohen et al. 2003) and best serves the analysis herein. Overall, the inclusion of empathy-sympathy and other related dual interest variables enables a more accurate prediction of which forces will increase the odds of becoming a conservation farmer.
VI. CONTRIBUTIONS OF THIS WORK
The approach guiding this study uses much of the familiar analytical machinery from microeconomics. In fact, if none of the statistical tests related to dual interests show explanatory power, the framework reverts to supporting the notion that farmers maximize self-interest only. This would suggest the need to maintain the historical focus on financial and technical assistance. Alternatively, if further statistical testing continues to produce support for the role of empathy-sympathy tempering self-interest, as found in this study, then a substantively different kind of conservation policy and programming is needed. All the implications revolve around the empathysympathy phenomenon.
Policy Implications
1. Policies need to move away from the historical "one size fits all" mindset. Instead, policy and programming need to recognize the diversity and complexity of farmer perspectives and frames, further confirming the contention by Bishop, Shumway, and Wandschneider (2010) that we need to recognize the "heterogeneity" of farmers. 2. Policies need to more fully recognize the complexity of farmer choice, with each farmer taking and trying to maintain control over emotion-influenced dual interests, with conscious, cognitive (i.e., rational choice) consideration playing a much less substantive role than presumed in microeconomics. 3. Conservation choices reflect a bit of self-sacrifice (i.e., altruism) in both domains of interest, emerging as farmers seek to balance and integrate, seeking pragmatic "peace-of-mind" in contrast to strictly utilitarian solutions, finding what works best at the time to resolve and satisfy their dual interests. 4. Policies and programs need to be specifically designed to nudge farmers into new habits that reflect an empathy-sympathy-based evolution of a shared common cause, in this case toward a new vision and cause for enhancing the water quality in Tuttle Creek Lake; farmers are quite empathetic, but not necessarily very sympathetic to that new vision. A nudge into considering being in sympathy with this vision is needed. Conservation policy and programming must also engage and otherwise nudge downstream users, as it works to build that common cause, that sense of being in sympathy with a new vision for the Lake. 5. If the policy and implemented nudge programs (including extension educational programming) do not lead to evolving a common cause, then said customization for each group is even more essential. 6. If policy and programs do not induce common cause, farmers more oriented to the self-interest need especially to be approached with very large financial incentives, with the danger of enticing those more oriented to the shared other-interest (i.e., under a one-sizefits-all approach) to abandon that other-interest and demand even larger incentives. This could result in conservation costing even more, overall. 7. Conservation policy process needs to be reframed and refocused, especially in recognizing the role of empathy-sympathy, which leads to finding new, shared sufficient reason(s). This is to say, the empirical results of this study indirectly confirm Bromley's (2006) contention that we need to move beyond welfare economics-based policy, the latter focusing attention only on maximizing the sum of individual expressions of self-interest. As Bromley (2006) clarifies, and these empirical results confirm, conservation policy and program facilitators would ask those on both sides of the table to act with empathysympathy, joining in common cause, evolving a new set of shared, pragmatic, sufficient reasons represented in their new shared interests.
Economic Measurement and Modeling Implications
The results are also encouraging with respect to using more generic, closer to basic science type scales (e.g., the selfism and empathy scales) to discern main tendencies in economic behavior. Also, the dual interest model helps in selecting which scales to use. We have tested the selfism scale in several studies, with good results; this first-time test of the empathy scale, also suggested by the theory, is also encouraging. The latter, in particular, is especially important: as a recent new book by de Waal (2009, ix) declares, "Greed is out, empathy is in," which is to say, we perhaps need to start acknowledging this other side of human nature. Continued testing of these kinds of empathy-sympathy frameworks is needed in order to further elaborate and validate their generalizability, going beyond the examination of farmer conservation behavior. Several especially intriguing questions arise, some of these suggested by one of the anonymous reviewers: Will the use of conservation practices change as farmers learn more about the "downstream" environmental effects on others? How can the public costeffectively educate farmers on such environmental effects and affects, and possibly nudge farmers toward expressions of empathy-sympathy? How might we increase the potential for synergy between conservation payments and expressions of empathy/sympathy? We invite your active participation and collaboration in finding answers to these and other questions suggested by the dual interest and empathy framework.
